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Abstract :: Let cognitivism be the view that moral judgments are cognitive mental 
states and noncognitivism the view that they are noncognitive mental states. Here I 
argue for moral judgment pluralism: some moral judgments are cognitive states and 
some are noncognitive states. More specifically, according to my pluralism some 
judgments are moral because they carry a moral content (e.g., that genocide is 
wrong) and some are moral because they employ a moral attitude (e.g., indignation, 
or guilt); the former are the cognitive moral judgments and the latter the 
noncognitive ones. After explaining and motivating the view, I argue that this kind of 
pluralism handles quite elegantly several of the core issues that have structured the 
debate on cognitivism vs. noncognitivism.  
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Let cognitivism be the view that moral judgments are cognitive mental states 
(roughly: belief-like, truth-apt states) and noncognitivism the view that they are 
noncognitive states. Because each view has some clear attractions, but also 
faces serious difficulties, much recent work in metaethics has focused on 
developing hybrid accounts according to which moral judgments are peculiar 
states that combine elements of the cognitive and of the noncognitive. In this 
paper, I recommend a different tack: moral judgment pluralism, according to 
which some moral judgments are cognitive and some are noncognitive.  
The paper is in two parts. The first part introduces the view I want to 
defend, the second part presents a preliminary case for it. In §2, I introduce the 
relevant notion of moral judgment, the distinction between cognitive and 
noncognitive states, and the resulting debate between cognitivism and 
noncognitivism about moral judgments. In §3, I present the view I call moral 
judgment pluralism and motivate it with two general considerations concerning 
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our mental life. In §4, I show how pluralism handles two core challenges to 
noncognitivism: the Frege-Geach problem and the objective phenomenology of 
moral judgments. In §5, I bring out pluralism’s resources in affecting the dialectic 
around a core challenge for cognitivism, namely, the threat of error theory. I 
close, in §6, with a discussion of the alleged internal link between moral 
judgment and motivation, arguing that pluralism is better placed than cognitivism 
and noncognitivism to accommodate some of the most prominent “data” in this 
area.  
The core idea behind the pluralism here proposed is the following. As I 
will use the term, a moral judgment is any mental state that embodies moral 
evaluation. Whenever we morally evaluate something in our mind, we are making 
a moral judgment. Now, mental states have both content and attitude, and, I will 
argue, moral evaluation can occur through either. Accordingly, we should expect 
there to be two kinds of moral judgments: ones that morally evaluate in virtue of 
carrying a morally evaluative content and ones that morally evaluate in virtue of 
deploying a morally evaluative attitude. This is the “philosophical hypothesis” I 
want to explore (sympathetically!). 
 
2 Cognitivism and Noncognitivism  
 
Cognitivism is the view that moral judgments are cognitive states, 
noncognitivism the view that they are noncognitive states. But how are we to 
understand the distinction between cognitive and noncognitive mental states? 
 One approach appeals to ostension of paradigms. Often it is assumed that 
belief is the paradigmatic cognitive state and desire the paradigmatic 
noncognitive state. In this approach, cognitivism holds that moral judgments are 
beliefs, or at least belief-like, while noncognitivism holds that they are desires, 
or desire-like. Another approach appeals to direction of fit: cognitive states 
have mind-to-world direction of fit, noncognitive ones a world-to-mind 
direction of fit. From this perspective, cognitivism holds that moral judgments 
have a mind-to-world direction of fit whereas noncognitivism holds that they 
have a world-to-mind direction of fit. A third approach relies on functional role: 
cognitive states’ functional role features centrally inference (its core is 
inferential role) while noncognitive states’ functional role features centrally 
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motivation (its core is a motivational role). Thus cognitivism holds that moral 
judgments are “inferentially integrated” states, while noncognitivism holds that 
they are “motivationally hot” states. A fourth approach focuses on correctness 
or fittingness conditions: cognitive states are ones it is fitting to enter when 
their contents are true, whereas the fittingness of entering a noncognitive state 
is not a matter of its content being true. Here cognitivism converges on the idea 
that moral judgments are truth-apt states, while noncognitivism is understood as 
the view that they are not.  
 It is epistemically possible that all these approaches will turn out to be 
extensionally equivalent, with mental states forking neatly into truth-apt, 
inferentially integrated, belief-like states with mind-to-world direction of fit on 
the one hand and truth-inapt, motivationally hot, desire-like states with world-
to-mind direction of fit on the other.  
It is also possible to integrate all four approaches (and potentially others) 
into a cluster account, whereby a mental state would (a) count as cognitive just 
if, say, it exhibits at least three of the four proposed marks of the cognitive, (b) 
count as noncognitive just if it exhibits three of the proposed marks of the 
noncognitive, and (c) count as a “hybrid state” if it exhibits, say, two marks of 
the cognitive and two of the noncognitive.  
In what follows I remain neutral on which of these ways of understanding 
the debate on cognitivism vs. noncognitivism is “best” (most fruitful, most 
accurate, or whatever). The view I want to develop here does not become 
invisible, or unavailable, on any of the above conceptions of the 
cognitive/noncognitive divide. So there is really no need for us to take a stand 
on the matter, so long as we are thinking clearly about what is at issue. I turn 
now to making some preliminary remarks on the notion of moral judgment as it 
features in the debate.  
 Note, first, that the term “judgment” as used in this debate is supposed to 
be neutral on the status of a mental state as cognitive or not – obviously, since 
both cognitivism and noncognitivism are proposed as accounts of moral 
judgments. Personally, this strikes me as an aberrant use, insofar as “judgment” 
clearly names a paradigmatically cognitive state. However, this use is so 
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entrenched in the relevant literature, and the matter is after all only 
terminological, so I will indulge here the entrenched terminology.  
 One element of instability in the entrenched usage is that “moral 
judgment” is sometimes used to denote a type of mental state but sometimes to 
denote a type of linguistic utterance or speech act. Very roughly, a “cognitive” 
judgment is an utterance in the indicative mood, a “noncognitive” one is an 
utterance in the imperative mood. Here I focus on moral judgments as mental 
states, though it is entirely possible that much of what I have to say could be 
“translated” into claims about utterances.  
 It is a nontrivial question what earns a judgment the qualification moral. 
Clearly, a moral judgment embodies a certain sort of evaluation. What sort? Well, 
moral evaluation, clearly. But what marks off moral from other kinds of 
evaluation is a difficult question. I want to stay neutral on this and rely on our 
intuitive, pretheoretic grasp of what it is to evaluate something morally, because 
philosophers with different commitments here will be equally in need of a notion 
of moral judgment, and should be able to speak to each other about moral 
judgments regardless of their substantive takes on the mark of the moral.  
 In my informal presentation of cognitivism and noncognitivism, I have 
formulated them as generics, with “moral judgments” used as a so-called bare 
plural. As is their want, however, philosophers typically think of cognitivism and 
noncognitivism as universally quantified theses: All moral judgments are 
cognitive/noncognitive. There is, of course, logical room for a thesis rejecting 
both universals, namely, the thesis that some moral judgments are cognitive 
states and some are noncognitive states. I call this conjunction of existentials 
pluralism about moral judgment. A version of this thesis is what I want to defend 
here.1 
 
3 Moral Contents and Moral Attitudes 
 
My basic motivation for pluralism about moral judgment may be put as follows. A 
moral judgment is a mental state that embodies moral evaluation, that is, an 
event or state consisting in morally evaluating something (or someone) in one’s 
mind. Now, mental states have both content and attitude, and – this is the key 
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claim – moral evaluation can occur through either. So, there are (a) mental states 
that morally evaluate as part of their content and (b) mental states that morally 
evaluate through their attitude. Thus we have reason to expect there to be two 
different kinds of moral judgment. Moreover, there are reasons to suspect that 
the states which morally evaluate through their content are cognitive, while the 
states which morally evaluate through their attitude are noncognitive.  
Consider first an analogy. It is obviously two different things to be afraid 
of flying and to believe that flying is dangerous. It is possible to have either 
without the other. Both states, however, embody a similar kind of evaluation: 
they both evaluate flying as dangerous. What, then, is the difference between 
them? My proposal is that the belief is a mental state that evaluates flying as 
dangerous through its content, whereas the fear is a mental state that evaluates 
flying as dangerous through its attitude. The content of the belief is that flying is 
dangerous; the concept of dangerousness is thus a constituent of this content. In 
contrast, dangerousness need not show up in the content of the fear – what one 
fears is typically not the dangerousness of the flying, but the flying itself. 
Rather, it is the very attitude of fearing that constitutes the evaluation of the 
flying as dangerous. In taking the fear attitude toward flying (rather than some 
other attitude), we thereby evaluate the flying as dangerous. We might say that 
the belief represents flying-as-dangerous, whereas the fear represents-as-
dangerous flying. In the belief, dangerousness is an element in what is 
represented, part of the state’s subject matter. In the fear, what is represented 
is only the flying; the element of dangerousness characterizes rather the manner 
in which the flying is represented. This is why it goes to the very nature of fear, 
as the type of mental state it is, that it presents its object “under the guise of 
the dangerous,” so to speak; whereas it is in no way essential to belief that it 
concerns the dangerous. Thankfully, most our beliefs are not about danger. 
Belief has its own distinctive manner of representing its subject matter, of 
course. Its proprietary manner of representation is as true: the belief that p is a 
mental state that represents-as-true the content <p>. This is why it is in the 
nature of belief, as the kind of mental state it is, to present its object under the 
guise of the true – in the same sense it is in the nature of fear to present its 
object under the guise of the dangerous. The fundamental contrast between the 
belief that flying is dangerous and the fear of flying may thus be put as follows:  
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 The belief    :: represents-as-true <flying is dangerous> 
 The fear    :: represents-as-dangerous <flying> 
Here the content is in chevrons and the attitude is the hyphenated expression 
preceding the chevrons. Dangerousness shows up in both states’ intentional 
structure, but shows up in different “parts” of that structure in each.  
To be clear, I am not denying that it is possible to fear dangerousness, nor 
that it is possible to believe that p is true. But this is not the basic form in either 
case: typically, we just believe that p, not that p is true; and likewise, we just 
fear x, not x’s dangerousness. Nonetheless, belief by its nature frames p as true, 
while fear by its nature frames x as dangerous. Still, when p concerns danger, a 
belief that p may also constitute an evaluation of something as dangerous. It 
does so, however, via the content it carries – whereas the fear does so via the 
attitude it takes toward its content.  
 (What kinds of properties are these representing-as-F properties? I want 
to stay neutral on this as well. They may turn out to be functional-role 
properties, or normative properties, or phenomenological properties, or 
something else. What matters is that they are attitudinal properties, as opposed 
to content properties. That is, they are properties mental states have not in 
virtue of the representational content they carry, but in virtue of the attitude 
they take toward that content – the distinctive manner, so to speak, in which 
their representational content is carried.)  
 Danger evaluation is of course not moral evaluation (except when moral 
danger is concerned). Fear is in that sense not a moral emotion. But some 
emotions are moral emotions, in that their distinctive manner o presenting their 
object is moral. Take guilt. It is again two different things to feel guilty about 
lying to Smith, say, and to believe that it was wrong to lie to Smith. Both states 
embody a similar evaluation: they both evaluate lying to Smith as wrong. The 
difference, I contend, is that the belief evaluates the lying as wrong through its 
content, whereas the guilt evaluates it as wrong through its attitude. Wrongness 
shows up in the content of the belief, but need not show up in the content of the 
guilt. What one feels guilty about may be simply the lying; it is in taking the guilt 
attitude toward the lying that we evaluate the lying as wrong. Again we may 
present the contrast as follows:  
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 The belief    :: represents-as-true <lying to Smith was wrong> 
 The guilt    :: represents-as-wrong <lying to Smith> 
In the belief, wrongness is an element in what is represented, a constituent of 
the belief’s representational content. In the guilt, what is represented is only the 
lying; the element of wrongness characterizes rather the manner in which the 
lying is represented: as-wrong is an aspect of how the subject is aware of the 
lying. This is why it goes to the very nature of guilt, as the type of mental state 
it is, that it presents its object under the guise of the wrong.  
 The point here is that the belief that it was wrong to lie evaluates the 
lying as wrong through its content, whereas the guilt about lying evaluates the 
lying as wrong through its attitude. Now, the wrongness in question does seem 
to be moral wrongness – at least in paradigmatic cases of guilt, and perhaps in 
all cases of guilt (there is some debate on this in the guilt literature, which will 
not concern us here – see, e.g., Greenspan 1992). Thus we have here two 
mental states that morally evaluate, but in importantly different styles: one 
through its content, the other through its attitude.  
 It is not difficult to find other pairs of mental states, one an emotion and 
the other a belief, such that both embody moral evaluation but one through its 
attitude and the other through its content. Compare feeling indignant about the 
Hutu’s mass slaughter of the Tutsi and believing that the Hutu’s mass slaughter 
of the Tutsi was extremely unjust (or whatever). These are clearly two different 
mental states. After enough time has passed, and after having felt indignant 
about it for a long time, you might find yourself emotionally exhausted, or just 
distracted, and no longer experience occurrent indignation, while still believing 
it was extremely unjust. Conversely, we can imagine a scenario where new 
information about a case may make you reconsider or even suspend your belief 
that some event was extremely unjust, without yet ridding yourself of your 
indignation about it – such is the recalcitrance of emotions. Still, both states 
have something important in common: they embody a moral evaluation of 
something (e.g., the Hutu’s slaughter of the Tutsi) as extremely unjust. My 
proposal is that the difference is due to the “location” of this moral evaluation in 
these states’ intentional structure: the indignation represents-as-extremely-
unjust <the Hutu’s slaughter of the Tutsi>, while the corresponding belief 
represents-as-true <the Hutu’s slaughter of the Tutsi was extremely unjust>. 
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(To be clear, I am using the expression “extremely unjust” as a dummy here, 
standing in for whatever the fuller, more textured description would be that 
would express more accurately the kind of moral evaluation characteristic of 
indignation.) 
 Note, now, that a belief with the content <the Hutu’s slaughter of the Tutsi 
was extremely unjust> has all the hallmarks of a cognitive state, while an 
indignation with the content <the Hutu’s slaughter of the Tutsi> has many of the 
hallmarks of a noncognitive state. Perhaps most clearly, the belief that the 
Hutu’s slaughter of the Tutsi was extremely unjust is certainly truth-apt, 
whereas the corresponding indignation is not. If there is no such property as 
being (extremely) unjust, then error theory would kick in and the belief would 
come out false – which is only possible, of course, for a truth-apt state. In 
contrast, it is a category mistake to describe an indignation as true (or false) in 
the relevant sense. An indignation can of course be fitting or unfitting, 
appropriate or inappropriate. But what determines which fittingness or 
appropriateness conditions attach to a mental state is its attitudinal profile. The 
reason belief’s fittingness conditions are truth condition is that belief 
represents-as-true. For indignation’s fittingness conditions to be truth 
conditions, indignation would have to likewise represent-as-true; whereas what 
indignation does is to represent-as-extremely-unjust (or something like that). 
So while indignation can be evaluated for fittingness, this is not an evaluation for 
truth. 
In addition, the belief about the Hutu slaughter of the Tutsi is also 
inferentially integrated: it can be inferred, for instance from the beliefs that (a) 
senseless slaughters fueled by ethnic hatred are extremely unjust and (b) the 
slaughter of Tutsi by the Hutu was a senseless slaughter fueled by ethnic 
hatred. In contrast, the functional role of indignation is clearly more motivational 
than inferential. While feeling indignant about a mass slaughter I feel pulled, at a 
minimum, to refrain from joining in; I do not in the first instance perform 
inferences to or from my indignation. Relatedly, indignation also has a world-to-
mind direction of fit: slaughter must stop for a fit to be established between the 
world and my mind. Belief, of course, is the paradigmatic state with mind-to-
world direction of fit.  
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This leaves only the issue of being belief-like or desire-like. The 
slaughter belief is trivially belief-like, of course. Whether indignation is desire-
like is a more complicated question, but it is certainly belief-unlike, given its 
truth-inaptness, motivational role, and direction of fit.  
I conclude that indignation is both (i) a noncognitive state (being as it is a 
truth-inapt, motivationally hot, belief-unlike state with a world-to-mind 
direction of fit) and (ii) a moral judgment (being as it is a way of morally 
evaluating something in our mind). It follows that there are moral judgments that 
are noncognitive states. Likewise, a belief with the content <the Hutu’s 
slaughter of the Tutsi was extremely unjust> is both (i) a cognitive state and (ii) 
a moral judgment (for the same kinds of reasons). It follows that there are moral 
judgments that are cognitive states. Hence moral judgment pluralism.   
 The case of indignation about a mass slaughter and a corresponding belief 
is not isolated. The same points just made will apply to the belief that it was 
wrong to lie to Smith and the guilt about having lied to Smith: the former has all 
the hallmarks of a cognitive state, the latter the hallmarks of a noncognitive 
state.2 And there will presumably be other belief/emotion pairs exhibiting a 
similar duality of moral evaluation – more on this shortly. So the ensuing 
pluralism is thorough and systematic, not a case where a conjunction of 
existentials is true of a class of items because all but one of them are F while 
the last one is ~F.  
In light of this, the “philosophical hypothesis” I would like to air is this: 
there are mental states – moral beliefs – that have morally evaluative contents, 
and there are also mental states – moral emotions – that employ morally 
evaluative attitudes. Both are forms of morally evaluating something in one’s 
mind, and so are moral judgments in our sense. But they are different kinds of 
moral judgment, insofar as they embody it in different ways. One represents-as-
morally-(dis)valuable some content <x>, the other represents-as-true a content 
of the form <x is M>, where M is a moral (dis)value predicate. The second moral 
judgment is a cognitive state, the first a noncognitive state. 
Incidentally, there is a principled reason, I suspect, why we can expect a 
number of such moral emotion/moral belief pairs in our psychological repertoire. 
Suppose A and B have been married happily, and happily monogamously, for 15 
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years, but that to “spice up” their life they have now decided together to “open” 
their relationship for a year. A month later, A sleeps with C, such that C≠B, and 
the next morning A feels tremendous guilt. There may be versions of this 
scenario where A takes the guilt to reveal a deep truth about RAB (I am trying to 
be as unromantic as possible here!) and goes back to B pleading for reverting to 
a “closed” relationship. But there are also versions where A recognizes the 
feeling of guilt but simply does not endorse it. Perhaps A sees the guilt as a 
vestige of an emotional setup that no longer serves to further either A’s or B’s 
flourishing inside RAB, and is thus still committed to the open-relationship 
project. There is clearly a difference between the mind of the person who feels 
guilty but does not endorse the feeling and the mind of the person who feels 
guilty and in addition endorses the feeling. What does this difference consist in? 
My inclination is to say: the person who endorses her guilt has formed a 
corresponding moral belief, whereas the person who does not has not. More 
generally, endorsement of moral emotions yields corresponding moral beliefs. If 
so, wherever we have a moral emotion, and the capacity to endorse it, there is a 
moral belief we can pair with it. And so there will be a moral emotion/moral 
belief pair for any “endorsable” moral emotion we have.3  
It is an open question, of course, just which emotions are the “moral 
emotions.” Various claims have been made on behalf of different emotions for 
this status, and various notions of moral emotion have been presupposed in 
these discussions. In this paper, the relevant notion of a moral emotion is the 
notion of an emotion which embodies moral evaluation in virtue of the attitude it 
deploys. It is up for debate just which emotions are like this, but there are some 
paradigms we can all agree on, such as guilt and indignation. There may also be 
positive counterparts of these, perhaps certain types of pride and appreciation, 
though the matter is complicated (see Kriegel forthcoming). Other natural 
candidates include certain types of respect (see notably Darwall 1977 on 
“recognition respect”) and its negative counterpart in contempt (see Mason 
2003), as well as certain types of love (Velleman 1999). It is not necessary to 
take a substantive position on these matters to appreciate that there is likely 
going to be a plurality of moral emotions, many of which admitting of potential 
endorsement resulting in a moral belief.  
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4 Pluralism, the Frege-Geach Problem, and Moral Phenomenology 
 
The basic motivation for pluralism about moral judgment is the fact that moral 
evaluation can occur either through content or through attitude, and a moral 
judgment just is a mental moral evaluation. Elsewhere I have also argued that 
there are also architectural reasons to expect the mind to employ two different 
kinds of moral judgment (Kriegel 2012). But in the remainder of this paper, I also 
want to show that pluralism brings with it novel resources for addressing the 
central challenges facing cognitivism and noncognitivism. I start, in this section, 
with two central challenges to noncognitivism.  
Perhaps the greatest dialectical embarrassment for noncognitivism is the 
Frege-Geach problem: the problem, very roughly, of understanding how moral 
judgments can embed in inference and reasoning if they are, as noncognitivists 
hold, noncognitive states that are not truth-apt (see Geach 1960). Consider this 
piece of perfectly good reasoning: if nobody visited grandma last week, then I 
ought to do so this week; nobody did visit grandma last week; so, I ought to visit 
grandma this week. Something like this reasoning could perfectly well take place 
in someone’s mind, and it would be a very good piece of reasoning indeed. What 
makes it good? Part of the answer is that it is a valid inference, in the familiar 
sense that it is truth-preserving: if the premises are true, then the conclusion 
must be true. This presupposes, however, that the premises and the conclusion 
are truth-apt, which by most accounts means they are cognitive states.  
Various moves are available to noncognitivists (e.g., fashioning a notion of 
validity that is not understood in terms of truth-preservation). Such moves are 
available to pluralists as well, of course. But pluralism is in reality entirely 
unthreatened by the Frege-Geach problem. The apparent lesson of the Frege-
Geach problem is that it is possible for us to infer moral judgments (and to infer 
from moral judgments). For this to be possible for us, we must, it would seem, 
have some moral judgments that are truth-apt. And this is something pluralism 
not only allows but entails. Crucially, there is nothing in the Frege-Geach 
“datum” – the fact that we can infer to and from moral judgments – to suggest 
that all moral judgments must be truth-apt (hence nothing to undermine the idea 
that some moral judgments are not truth-apt). In other words, the fact that we 
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have moral judgments that enter into inferential relations does not show that we 
lack moral judgments that do not enter into inferential relations.  
In conclusion, once we frame clearly what the Frege-Geach datum is, we 
see that it presents no problem for pluralism and is if anything a feather in its 
cap, insofar as pluralism predicts that some moral judgments could enter into 
inferential relations. 
I want to say something similar about another traditional source of 
resistance to noncognitivism. This is the idea, close to many cognitivists’ heart, 
that moral judgments have “objective pretensions.” The idea is at bottom 
phenomenological: that judging that genocide is wrong feels like mentally 
asserting an objective fact. When one wonders whether abortion is morally 
permissible, it is liable to feel to one as though there is a correct answer, an 
answer one is trying to find out. Reaching a judgment may then feel like coming 
down on the issue, thus committing to the truth of one position at the expense of 
the other.  
 Here too, I want to say that the phenomenological datum is, strictly 
speaking, that some moral judgments feel objective. Certainly whether genocide 
is wrong or not is something most of us have beliefs about. We do not just have 
emotions like indignation when it comes to genocide, we also endorse these 
emotions. We should only expect, then, that such beliefs will exhibit the 
objective phenomenology cognitivist point to. Thus the pluralist predicts that 
some moral judgments have objective pretensions.  
Unlike the cognitivist, however, the pluralist has room for moral 
judgments that lack this objectivistic phenomenology. The clearest examples 
would be the moral emotions we experience but do not endorse. Going back to 
A’s sorry experiment in bold unconventional lifestyle, we can envisage A feeling 
instinctively guilty about sleeping with C but taking distance from that feeling, 
actively “dis-endorsing” it so to speak. In that scenario, A’s disendorsed guilt 
will likely not feel like a representation of an objective fact, the objective fact 
that it was wrong to sleep with C; on the contrary, it will feel like a subjective 
hang-up to get over. Both kinds of mental moral evaluation occur in our life, I 
contend: those that feel like they home in on an objective moral fact (these will 
include prominently paradigmatic moral beliefs) and those that feel much more 
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subjective (these will include prominently unendorsed – or perhaps disendorsed 
– moral emotions). All of which is precisely as the pluralist predicts.  
Might the cognitivist insist that, even if we have emotions that embody 
moral evaluation, only beliefs that embody moral evaluation deserve to be called 
“moral judgments” – say because the emotions are somehow “less than a 
judgment”? 
She could, of course, but if this is intended as an objection to pluralism, it 
faces a dilemma. For the claim is either (a) that moral emotions should not be 
called moral judgments given the everyday sense of “judgment” or (b) that they 
should not be called that given a technical sense of “judgment.” Option (b) is not 
really viable, however, given that the term “moral judgment” is used in the 
relevant technical literature as neutral between the cognitive and the 
noncognitive (since cognitivism and noncognitivism are both theories of a 
phenomenon referred to in the literature as “moral judgment”). The idea must 
be, then, that the term “judgment” as commonly used denotes a doxastic rather 
than emotional state. But if this is the idea, I can only concur wholeheartedly, 
since as noted I think the use of “judgment” as neutral between the cognitive 
and the noncognitive is aberrant. In this form, however, the objection becomes 
purely verbal. After all, what the pluralist is giving a theory of is the 
phenomenon of morally evaluating something in one’s mind, and this objector 
appears to contest no aspect of the pluralist’s theory of this phenomenon. In 
particular, she does not contest the idea that we can morally evaluate something 
in our mind by having emotions that morally evaluate that thing. She just 
chooses to reserve the label “moral judgment” for moral beliefs, which is of 
course her prerogative. As long as the pluralist’s underlying picture of how the 
mind morally evaluates is left intact, though, the question of what to grant the 
label “moral judgment” to becomes a bookkeeping question we have no need to 
be overly exercised over.  
 
5 Pluralism and the Specter of Error Theory 
 
One of the main worries about cognitivism is the looming specter of error 
theory. The thought goes something like this. Suppose moral judgments are 
beliefs. A belief is true just when there is something in the world that makes it 
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true – a truthmaker. Thus, if evaluating the Armenian genocide as morally wrong 
in one’s mind is just having the belief that the Armenian genocide was morally 
wrong, then there must be something in the world that makes true this belief – a 
state of affairs, presumably, consisting in the Armenian genocide instantiating 
the property of being morally wrong. For a variety of reasons, however, many 
philosophers have suspected that there could be no such properties and 
therefore no such states of affairs. That is, there can be no moral truthmakers. If 
so, beliefs to the effect that those states of affairs obtain are erroneous one and 
all. Our entire moral-belief system is, in a sense, a grand illusion. 
 This problem may appear to affect moral judgment pluralism just as much 
as cognitivism, since pluralism is committed more or less to all the moral beliefs 
cognitivism is committed to; it just adds to them non-belief states that also 
embody moral evaluation. In this section, however, I want to argue that pluralism 
provides two new kinds of input into the dialectic that make error theory 
significantly less pernicious.  
 Obviously, the simplest solution for the cognitivist is to insist that there 
are moral facts that make moral beliefs true. This move is of course available to 
the pluralist as well. What I want to convince you in this section is that the 
pluralist has certain moves available to her that are not available to the 
cognitivist – in other words, that the pluralist is in a better dialectical position 
than the cognitivist.  
 Start with the following question: What is so bad about error theory? 
Suppose there are in fact no moral truthmakers, so our moral beliefs are untrue. 
That would be unfortunate for us qua moral believers, but what difference would 
it make to us qua moral theorists? What is the theoretical embarrassment in 
error theory? It might be true, after all, that there are no moral truthmakers, but 
that we have moral beliefs. If so, a theory of moral judgments should embrace 
error theory.  
There are two theoretical problems, I want to suggest, with error theory, 
and pluralism helps with both.  
The first problem has to do with the fittingness, or appropriateness, or 
correctness conditions of belief. It is fitting to have a belief just when the belief 
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is true. If p does not hold, then belief is the wrong attitude to take toward p. And 
if you know that p does not hold, then you should definitely not adopt the 
attitude of belief toward p. Accordingly, if evaluating the Armenian genocide as 
morally wrong in your mind is a matter of having the belief that the Armenian 
genocide is morally wrong, and the belief is untrue, then given that it is never 
fitting to have an untrue belief, it follows that it is unfitting to evaluate the 
Armenian genocide as morally wrong in your mind. And if you happen to be a 
moral anti-realist, rejecting moral truthmakers, then you should definitely not 
evaluate the Armenian genocide as wrong in your mind. The first problem with 
error theory is that such consequences are manifestly implausible. In reality, 
few things are more fitting than evaluating the Armenian genocide as wrong in 
one’s mind. And it is very odd to think that, having been convinced by one 
argument or another for moral antirealism, one should stop evaluating the 
Armenian genocide as wrong in my mind. 
 Here pluralism offers a clear dialectical advantage as compared to 
cognitivism. For suppose that it is never fitting to adopt the belief attitude 
toward the proposition that the Armenian genocide was morally wrong. Still, 
pluralism allows that there are other ways to morally evaluate the Armenian 
genocide as wrong in one’s mind. We can also adopt the right emotional attitudes 
toward the Armenian genocide – say, feel indignant about it. Accordingly, if I am 
a moral antirealist who rejects moral truthmakers, I can still rationally and 
fittingly evaluate the Armenian genocide as morally wrong in my mind, for 
instance by feeling indignant about it. In this way, pluralism can embrace error 
theory about cognitive moral judgments and still account for the fact manifest 
fact that many of the mental evaluations we perform are fitting or appropriate. 
 It is also significant for the fittingness status of moral beliefs themselves 
that certain corresponding moral evaluations are fitting. It is true that for a belief 
that torturing kittens for fun and profit is wrong to be fitting, the belief must be 
true; and that if there are no moral truthmakers, then it is untrue. Nonetheless, 
there is an important difference between the belief that torturing kittens for fun 
and profit is wrong and the belief that writing poetry on a Wednesday is wrong. 
The error theorist needs to be able to account for this difference. The pluralist 
has a ready explanation. Although the belief that torturing kittens for fun and 
profit is wrong is not itself fitting, it corresponds to a moral judgment that is 
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fitting, namely, indignation about torturing kittens for fun and profit. (What is it 
for a belief B to “correspond” to a fitting moral judgment J? Perhaps for B to be 
formable by mere endorsement of J.) In contrast, not only is the belief that 
writing poetry on a Wednesday is wrong unfitting, it corresponds to no moral 
judgment that is fitting. This makes a crucial difference between the two beliefs.  
 To signal the different status of these two beliefs, we might with some 
legitimacy introduce a notion of “secondary fittingness.” A moral belief B to the 
effect that some x is wrong (or is M for any moral predicate M) is secondarily 
fitting just if there is a moral emotion E, such that E represents-as-wrong x (or 
more generically, such that E represents-as-M x). The justification for calling B 
“secondarily fitting” here is simply that B and E are in an important sense the 
same kind of moral evaluation, and E is fitting. The kitten-torture belief is 
“secondarily fitting,” then, because (i) it evaluates kitten torture as morally 
wrong and (ii) there is a fitting – primarily fitting – mental state that evaluates 
kitten torture as morally wrong (namely, indignation about kitten torture). In 
contrast, Wednesday-poetry is both primarily and secondarily unfitting: 
primarily, because it is not a true belief, and secondarily, because there is no 
other way to fittingly evaluate Wednesday poetry as wrong in one’s mind.  
 This is important, because a second theoretical problem with error theory 
is that it fails to make crucial discriminations. It is all well and good to say that 
all moral beliefs are false, but surely we must find some merit in the belief that 
genocide is morally wrong and a corresponding demerit in the belief that 
genocide is morally unproblematic. Compare: the grand illusion theory of color 
perception holds that all color perception is illusory, since there are no color 
properties in the world; but such a theory is often supplemented with an account 
of the difference between (a) a person who undergoes bluish experiences when 
looking at the sky on a sunny day and grayish experiences when looking at an 
overcast sky and (b) a person who when looking at the sky has all manner of 
random color experiences, from the purplish to the orangish, regardless of the 
state of the sky. (For a relatively well-known attempt to capture this difference, 
see Chalmers 2006, esp. §7.) The error theorist likewise must find a way to 
draw crucial distinctions between moral beliefs. The moral judgment pluralist 
can do so by distinguishing those moral beliefs that are secondarily fitting from 
those that are secondarily unfitting. This is because she allows (primarily) fitting 
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non-belief moral judgments that embody the same kind of moral evaluation as 
some moral beliefs. The cognitivist, in contrast, has no similar resource in her 
theory, since for her all moral judgments are beliefs.  
 To repeat, I am well aware that one way the cognitivist has out error 
theory is to embrace the sort of robust moral realism that comes with an 
ontology of objective moral facts that can serve as truthmakers for moral 
beliefs. No part of our discussion is intended to question this kind of move. Our 
discussion is once removed from the substantive question of whether to 
embrace moral realism in the metaphysics of morals. Our point here is only that 
this sort of move is available equally to the cognitivist and to the pluralist, but 
that in addition, there are important moves available to the pluralist which are 
unavailable to the cognitivist. Bringing out this asymmetry, and the resulting 
increased stability of the pluralist’s dialectical position, is the only purpose of 
the present discussion. Its upshot may be stated thus: If it turns out that the 
world contains no moral facts that could serve as truthmakers for moral beliefs, 
then the cognitivist (i) must apparently hold that morally evaluating genocide 
negatively in one’s mind is always and everywhere inappropriate and (ii) cannot 
produce any distinction between believing in the permissibility of genocide and 
believing in the impermissibility of genocide; in contrast, the pluralist (i) allows 
for some perfectly fitting negative moral evaluations of genocide and (ii) can 
distinguish in a principled way between beliefs in the permissibility and in the 
impermissibility of genocide (namely, in terms of what I have called secondary 
fittingness). In other words, if it turns out that the world contains no moral facts 
that could serve as truthmakers for moral beliefs, cognitivism leads directly to 
some fairly intolerable consequences which are avoided by pluralism.  
 There is an objection to this line of thought that may be put as follows. 
For indignation about the Armenian genocide to be fitting, it would have to be 
the case that the Armenian genocide is wrong. If it is not wrong, what makes 
indignation about it fitting? But now, once we admit that that the Armenian 
genocide is wrong, it would seem that a belief to the effect that it is wrong 
would be true after all, and hence fitting. So there cannot be any real dialectical 
advantage here for pluralism over cognitivism, insofar as it could never be the 
case that indignation about x is fitting but belief that x is morally wrong is 
 18 
unfitting. For what makes indignation about x fitting is that x is morally wrong, 
and if x is morally wrong, then a belief that x is morally wrong is also fitting.  
 My response is that although it is certainly one legitimate view that 
something’s being morally wrong is what makes it the case that indignation 
about it is fitting, that is not the only legitimate view in the area. One notable 
alternative is that what makes indignation about the Armenian genocide fitting is 
a collection of “descriptive” or “empirical” facts about the Armenian genocide: 
that it involved the death of many innocent people, that these innocents were 
slaughtered due to their ethnicity, that suffering in Armenian families persisted 
many decades thereafter, and so on. It is these empirical facts describing the 
Armenian genocide, not the moral fact that the Armenian genocide was wrong, 
that makes indignation about the Armenian genocide fitting (compare Scanlon 
1998 Ch.2). If this is right, then indignation about the Armenian genocide can be 
fitting even if there are no moral facts, as the error theorist claims. Here lies the 
dialectical advantage of the pluralist over the cognitivist, then: if (a) there are no 
moral facts, but (b) it is in virtue of certain empirical facts that certain moral 
emotions are fitting, then the cognitivist is stuck with the unseemly consequence 
that mentally evaluating the Armenian genocide as wrong is always and 
everywhere unfitting, whereas the pluralist avoids this consequence. Now, it is 
true that if one rejects (a) or (b), then the pluralist has no advantage over the 
cognitivist: if one rejects (a), then the cognitivist has truthmakers for moral 
beliefs, which can therefore be fitting; if one rejects (b), then the pluralist cannot 
account for the fittingness of moral emotions (without, that is, making moral 
beliefs fitting as well). Still, the fact that on some perfectly defensible 
constellation of positions in this area the pluralist has an advantage over the 
cognitivist means that the pluralist brings something new to the table, something 
that allows us to evade error theory where cognitivism dooms us to it.  
 To be clear, none of the above is intended as endorsing (a) and (b). My 
discussion is once removed from the vicissitudes of the relevant first-order 
debates and pertains rather to the overall dialectical landscape. What I have 
attempted to bring out in this section is the extra resources the pluralist has for 
dealing with one of the central issues in the extant literature on the fate of moral 
cognitivism. In the next section, we do the same exercise on another issue 
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central to the dispute between cognitivists and noncognitivists: the connection 
between moral judgment and motivation.  
 
6 Pluralism and Moral Motivation 
 
One of the chief arguments against cognitivism, and thus for noncognitivism, 
goes roughly like this: 1) moral judgments are inherently motivating; 2) cognitive 
states are not; therefore, 3) moral judgments are not cognitive states. The 
noncognivist maintains that mental states such as desire and emotion move one 
to action by their nature, whereas mental states such as belief and perception 
merely record how things are, without in themselves “commenting” on what we 
should do about it. But moral judgments, by their very nature, do comment on 
what we should do about things, and are therefore better thought of as 
noncognitive states cut of the same cloth as desire or emotion.  
Although it is certainly possible to contest Premise 2 of the above 
argument, most cognitivists have denied Premise 1. David Brink (1989 Ch.3), for 
instance, argues that 1 is incompatible with the conceivability of an amoralist: a 
person who judges that she ought to do something but is simply unmoved to do 
it. You may find yourself lying on your couch, thinking to yourself you should 
really go to that dinner party you are expected at, and somehow just feel no pull 
to actually do it. Now, the noncognitivist may certainly insist that in such 
circumstances you do feel an ever so slight tug to go to the party, or else you 
cannot be seriously described as judging that you ought to go. Bracketing these 
further debates, I want to point out that the pluralist can easily take at face value 
the apparent conceivability of an amoralist. It would have to be someone who 
has certain moral beliefs without having the corresponding moral emotions 
(someone, e.g., who believes it would be wrong not to go to the party but does 
not feel guilty about not going). This might not be a typical “someone,” but it is 
certainly a conceivable “someone.” 
One influential argument for an internal, non-contingent connection 
between moral judgment and motivation comes from Michael Smith (1994 Ch. 3) 
and goes something like this. There is a reliable correlation in good and strong-
willed persons between making moral judgments and being motivated to act 
accordingly. This correlation calls for explanation. The noncognitivist’s 
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explanation is that moral judgment is inherently motivating: it is part of what 
makes a mental state a moral judgment that it motivates. The cognitivist 
explanation is different: that the moral judgment in itself is not motivating, but in 
good and strong-willed persons it is paired with another mental state that is, 
namely, the desire de dicto to do the right thing (i.e., a desire to do the right 
thing whatever that turns out to be). The noncognitivist explanation is far 
superior, claims Smith. For a good and strong-willed person may well lack a 
desire de dicto to do the right thing, not because she has some opposing desires, 
but because this specific desire has simply never occurred to her. 
The pluralist has a third and distinct explanation, however. It is that in 
good and strong-willed persons, moral beliefs and moral emotions tend to 
converge. Certainly classical portrayals of the virtuous person emphasize the 
harmony of “reason and emotion,” and intuitively, when a good and strong-
willed person believes that it is wrong not to go to a dinner party at which she is 
expected, she feels guilty about not going. Lying there on her couch, totally not 
in the mood for this party but keenly aware of being expected at it, her guilt 
increases and increases until she gets up and goes. Because of the reliable 
correlation between her moral beliefs and moral emotions, and the inherent 
motivational character of the latter, there is also a reliable correlation between 
her moral beliefs and her motivation. On this explanation, then, the reason good 
and strong-willed persons who judge that it would be morally right to φ tends to 
φ is neither that all moral judgments are inherently motivating, nor that such 
persons desire de dicto to do the right thing; rather, it is that such persons tend, 
on the one hand, to have emotions that represent-as-morally-right φ-ing, which 
emotions are inherently motivating, and, on the other hand, tend to have beliefs 
that represent-as-true the moral rightness of φ-ing when they have emotions 
that represent-as-morally-right φ-ing.  
 In this way, pluralism can capture some of the alleged “data” that motivate 
both the cognitivist’s and the noncognitivist’s view on the connection between 
moral judgment and motivation. The cognitivist’s “datum” (or one of them) is the 
conceivability of the amoralist; (one of) the noncognitivist’s is the reliable 
correlation between moral judgment and motivation in good and strong-willed 
persons. Pluralism is not just consistent with these “data” – it predicts them. 
Cognitivism and noncognitivism, in contrast, each predict only one of them. Note 
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well: I do not mean to endorse either datum here! The claim I am trying to make 
is again once removed from the ground-level debate about the actual connection 
between judgment and motivation, and pertains only to the resources different 
views of the nature of moral judgment have for accommodating certain 
considerations that have proved alluring to a significant number of moral 
philosophers. 
 
Conclusion  
 
One of the liveliest debates in the philosophy of mind circa 1990 was between 
the “theory theory” and the “simulation theory” of folk psychology. The 
organizing question was: to understand each other, do we apply an implicit 
theory of what makes people tick, or do we “put ourselves” in other people’s 
shoes and simulate their inner lives? It took only a little over a decade for many 
of this debate’s protagonists to start converging on a simple answer: Both! 
There is no theoretical reason why we should be assumed to use only one of 
these two types of mechanism – theory application and mental simulation – in 
trying to understand each other. On the contrary, there is every reason to 
assume both mechanisms are operative in us. And so the real issue had become 
what specific roles one should give to each of these mechanisms in one’s overall 
approach to folk psychology. 
 My recommendation in this paper has been to take a similar stance toward 
the debate between cognitivism and noncognitivism about moral judgment. Do 
we mentally morally evaluate aspects of the world through cognitive states like 
belief, or through noncognitive states like emotion? I recommend we answer 
“Both!” here as well. I see little more theoretical pressure to assume a single 
manner of moral orientation on the world in our psychological repertoire.4 I have 
argued that once we adopt the pluralist approach, the considerations that have 
structured much of the debate on cognitivism vs. noncognitivism lose much of 
their force. Crucially, however, the motivation for pluralism does not come 
simply from the theoretical benefits attendant to its adoption. The basic – and 
entirely independent – motivation for pluralism is that moral evaluation can occur 
either through content or through attitude. So it stands to reason that there 
should be these two fundamentally different modes of morally evaluating 
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something in one’s mind. In other words, the content-attitude distinction, 
combined with the observation that both content and attitude can embody moral 
evaluation, should make us expect there to be both cognitive and noncognitive 
moral judgments.5 
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1 If one formulates cognitivism and noncognitivism as generics rather than universals, it 
becomes trickier to formulate pluralism. But this is mostly because the exact degree of 
freedom involved in withdrawing from a universal to a generic is unclear at present, 
with many different theories proposed but none commanding consensus (see Leslie and 
Lerner 2016 for a partial review). On the simplest theory, generics are disguised 
universals about typical or normal instances (see, e.g., Nickel 2008). Thus, to say that 
moral judgments are cognitive states is to say that all typical moral judgments are 
cognitive states. Pluralism would then become the thesis that some typical moral 
judgments are cognitive and some are noncognitive. On other views of what a generic 
exactly says, pluralism would have to be formulated differently. Most generically, so to 
speak, pluralism could be formulated as the conjunction of two negations of generics: 
“moral judgments are cognitive” is false & “moral judgments are noncognitive” is false. 
 
2 I am assuming here that emotions cannot be exhaustively reduced to belief or some 
other cognitive state. There are of course theories of emotion that do reduce them 
entirely to beliefs, but against the background of those theories the debate between 
cognitivism and noncognitivism becomes considerably less interesting anyway. 
 
3 This does commit us to a specific picture of what is involved in the relevant form of 
endorsement. It would have to be a process that effects a transition from a mental state 
that represents-as-F <x> to one that represents-as-true <x is F> (e.g., from a state 
that represents-as-morally-wrong <sleeping with C> to a state that represents-as-true 
<sleeping with C was morally wrong>). What endorsement does, on this view, is to take 
information which is in some sense implicit in the attitude and make it explicit in the 
content. 
 
4 The only pressure toward a unitarian account here comes from the demand that moral 
judgment be intimately linked to motivation, but as we saw the nature of the link is quite 
ambiguous and claims to accommodate it best are made by the cognitivist, the 
noncognitivist, and indeed pluralist alike. 
 
5 For comments on a previous draft, I am grateful to Abe Roth and an anonymous 
referee for Philosophical Studies. I have benefited from presenting material relevant to 
this paper at Brown University and Rice University, as well as at the Chapel Hill 
Normativity Workshop. I am grateful to the audiences there, in particular Mustafa 
Aghahosseini, Christian Blacèt, Gwen Bradford, Alex Campbell, Jamie Dreier, Anna 
Giustina, Eric Guindon, Max Khan Hayward, Richard Heck, Thomas Hofweber, Christa 
Johnson, Hitkarsh Kumar, Andrew Lee, Chad Marxsen, Daniel Pinto, Gideon Rosen, 
Reuben Sass, Josh Schechter, Sarah Stroud, Patricia Thornton, Anna Tsvetkov, Alex 
Worsnip, and Orfeas Zormpalas.  
